I. Introduction
This paper presents an analytically tractable model of growth resulting from firm-specific preference and technology shocks, selective survival of successful firms, and imitation by entering firms. The model generates balanced growth and is consistent with salient features of the firm size distribution. As many have noted, the size distribution of firms exhibits a striking pattern. Using 1997 data from the U. S. Census, Axtell [2001] finds that the log right tail probabilities of this distribution, with firm size measured by the log of employment, are on a virtual straight line with a slope of -1.06. Figure I shows the data for 2002, together with a curve generated by a version of the model presented in this paper, as well as the maximum likelihood esti mate of a lognormal distribution. A straight line fitted using all size categories with at least five employees has a slope of -1.06. This evidence suggests that the firm size distribution, with firm size measured by employment S, is well approximated over much of its range by a Pareto distribution with right tail probabilities of the form 1/S^, with a tail index ? around 1.06.1 * The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System. I thank Michele Boldrin, Jonathan Eaton, Xavier Gabaix, Thomas J. Holmes, Samuel S. Kortum, and Robert E. Lucas, Jr., for helpful discussions based on earlier versions of this paper. Two referees provided valuable input. The usual disclaimer applies. A technical appendix is available at www.luttmer.org.
1. The data shown in Figure I The remarkable and interpreted nini [1958] , Stei as Gibrat [1931] costs, and the ease with which firms can imitate. The explanation is set in the context of a general equilibrium model, and this allows one to predict the effects of changes in various barriers to entry on the level and the growth rate of aggregate output. The model can also be extended in a tractable way to accommodate more extensive forms of heterogeneity [Luttmer 2004 ], making it a potentially useful tool for empirical research on the relation between firm heterogeneity and aggregate productivity. Firms in this paper are monopolistic competitors producing differentiated goods, as in Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] , using a linear technology. There is an entry cost for new firms, and it takes a fixed cost per unit of time to continue an existing firm. A typical firm is subject to shocks to both productivity and the demand for its differentiated good. These shocks are firm-specific and perma nent.3 A stationary firm size distribution arises if the average rate at which these shocks improve the profitability of incumbent firms is not too high relative to the rate at which the technology available to potential entrants improves over time.
One version of this economy is a model of technology adoption in which the technologies available to potential entrants improve at an exogenous rate. This rate determines the growth rate of the economy. If there is not too much heterogeneity among entrants, then the equilibrium size distribution is well approximated, over much of its range, by a Pareto distribution. A tail index ? slightly above 1 arises if the technologies available to entrants improve at a rate that is only slightly above the rate at which the technolo gies of incumbents improve. In this economy, a proportional in crease in entry and fixed costs lowers the level of aggregate output by reducing the number of firms and thereby the variety of goods produced. This is analogous to results for static economies in Krugman [1979] . The shape of the size distribution is not affected by proportional changes in entry and fixed costs. A re duction in the entry cost alone does change the shape of the size more firms and more variety, but the positive effect of this on the level of output is weakened by the fact that more inefficient firms will enter and survive.4 A second version of this economy is a model of endogenous growth in which entering firms can imperfectly imitate incum bent firms. This makes the tail index ? endogenous. A potential entrant can pay an entry cost to sample at random from the population of incumbent firms. The entrant can then attempt to imitate the incumbent drawn from the population by introducing a new good with an initial productivity and market size that are scaled down relative to the productivity and market size of the incumbent. This spillover ensures that the technologies available to potential entrants are never so far behind those of incumbent firms that entry of new firms is not feasible. The economy has a continuum of stationary size distributions that are consistent with balanced growth. One possibility is that the log of firm size follows a gamma distribution. All possible size distributions have a tail similar to that of a Pareto distribution, with an analogous tail index ? that must be slightly above 1 to fit the data shown in Figure I . The main result for this economy is that ? converges to 1 from above as the cost of entry becomes large relative to the fixed cost of operating a firm, and as the extent to which new entrants lag behind incumbents in terms of productivity and market size, becomes large.
To see why the asymptote ? = 1 arises, note that the mean of a distribution with right tail probabilities of the order 1/S^ grows without bound as ? approaches 1 from above. Firm profitability is tied to size, and the fact that potential entrants attempt to imi tate a randomly sampled incumbent ties the expected gains from entry to the average size of incumbents. In equilibrium, high entry costs must be compensated for by high expected gains from entry. Thus, the average incumbent must be large, and especially so if entrants lag far behind incumbents in terms of productivity and market size. As in the version with exogenous growth, a proportional reduction in entry and fixed costs increases the level of output in this economy. The effect of lowering entry costs alone is to lower the average size and profitability of firms. This is achieved in 4. See Parente and Prescott [1999] for an alternative model of technology adoption in which lowering barriers to entry can have large positive effects on the level of output.
SELECTION, GROWTH, AND THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS 1107 equilibrium by an increase in the turnover rate of firms. In turn, this speeds up the selection mechanism by which aggregate pro ductivity improves over time. As a result, the growth rate of the economy increases. A reduction in barriers to entry will, over time, have large effects on output when entrants can imitate incumbents. This is in sharp contrast to the level effect that arises when the technologies available to entrants are exogenous. The firm size distribution, together with data on the size of entering firms and the rate at which new firms enter can be used to infer the parameters of the firm growth process. These param eters imply a decomposition of output growth into components due to within-firm technological progress and selection. U. S. data suggest that about half of output growth can be attributed to selection. The parameter estimates also produce predictions for the hazard rate with which firms exit, and these are in line with observed survivor functions. However, the variance of firm growth rates is higher than suggested by the return variance of the typical firm traded in U. S. stock markets.
LA. Related Literature
Incumbent firms in this paper are engaged in a form of learning-by-doing, and imitation by entering firms creates an externality, two features of growth emphasized by Arrow [1962] .5
Following Romer [1990] , Grossman and Helpman [1991] , and Aghion and Howitt [1992] , technological progress is embodied in firms, and firms have some market power. As in Romer [1990] , this takes the form of monopolistic competition.6 The current paper differs in two important respects from Romer [1990] . First, firms experience idiosyncratic permanent shocks to their technol ogies and to the demands for their differentiated commodities. This introduces selection as a mechanism by which the economy wide distribution of productivity improves over time. Random growth and selection are crucial for matching the observed firm size distribution. Second, the mechanism that allows potential entrants to make use of the existing stock of ideas is made explicit. This yields an economic interpretation of the size distri 5. The more recent literature making use of these features includes Boldrin and Scheinkman [1988] , Lucas [1988] , Stokey [1988] , and Young [1991] .
6. Jones and Manuelli [1990] and Boldrin and Levine [2000] construct models of endogenous growth that do not rely on imperfect competition or externalities. 1108 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS bution shown in Figure I : imitation is imperfect and entry must be costly.7 In Jovanovic [1982] , the effects of selection on the evolution of an industry eventually die out because firms are not subject to ongoing technology shocks. In Hopenhayn [1992] , the industry equilibrium is stationary, but there is no reason for the implied size distribution to look like the one displayed in Figure I . In this paper, all shocks to preferences and technology are permanent. Stationarity of the cross-sectional size distribution is a conse quence of the spillover that relates the productivity of entrants to the distribution of productivity among incumbents. Gabaix [1999] shows how a geometric Brownian motion with a reflecting barrier gives rise to a power law and shows the precise circumstances under which this will lead to Zipf s law. He uses this to construct a model of cities that can account for the heavy right tail of the city size distribution. In the presence of entry and fixed costs, the process of firm entry and exit does not lead to a reflecting barrier, but to a "return process" according to which firms exit below some barrier and enter at a point above this barrier. The two processes are closely related, and the lim iting argument used by Gabaix [1999] will be discussed later. Essentially the same return process as used in the technology adoption part of this paper also arises in Miao [2005] , who con siders a model of industry equilibrium and debt-financing in which default triggers exit.
Based on a data set that includes not only large cities, Eeck hout [2004] has argued that the size distribution of cities or "places" is approximately lognormal rather than Pareto. The maximum-likelihood estimate shown in Figure I shows that the lognormal distribution is greatly at odds with the observed size distribution of firms. Just like the lognormal distribution, the gamma distributions generated in this paper have a mode that exceeds the minimum firm size. In contrast to the lognormal, these gamma distributions can also match the heavy right tail of the firm size distribution. The economy described here has many elements in common 7. Jovanovic [1982] emphasizes the role of selection in the evolution of an industry. Nelson and Winter [1982] relate selection, imitation, and growth, but their model is not analytically tractable. Jovanovic and MacDonald [1994] con sider industry growth with very general forms of imitation. Other models of imitation and growth include Segerstrom [1991] , Aghion, Harris, Howitt, and Vickers [2001] , and Eeckhout and Jovanovic [2002] . Barro and Sala-i-Martin [2004] present models of growth that rely on cross-country imitation. with Klette and Kortum [2004] , who build on Grossman and Helpman [1991] to construct a quality ladder model in which firm growth is the result of research and development choices made by firms. Every good produced by a firm can give rise to a new good or can be lost to a competitor following exponentially distributed waiting times. As a result, the underlying building block of the model is a birth and death process for the number of goods produced by a firm. In this paper it is a geometric Brownian motion that represents the state of consumer tastes and firm productivity. For both processes, mean growth rates are indepen dent of size. In the case of the geometric Brownian motion, the same is true for the variance of firm growth rates. In the case of the birth and death process, averaging across goods implies that the variance is inversely proportional to size. The resulting size distribution is the logarithmic series distribution. This distribu tion is highly skewed, but a plot as in Figure I generates a curve that is concave and does not asymptote to a straight line for large firm sizes. The right tail of the distribution is too thin.
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright [2004] solve for the firm size distribution in an economy with many industries and many iden tical firms in each industry. Firms face a fixed cost in every period and operate Cobb-Douglas technologies that exhibit decreasing returns. Human capital is industry specific, and the number and size of firms in a particular industry at a point in time is deter mined by a static free-entry condition. Because of this static free-entry condition, it does not matter which of the infinitesimal firms in an industry exit when net exit from a particular industry is required. As a result, the model has no determinate implica tions for the dependence of firm exit rates on age, or for the joint age-size distribution of firms. In equilibrium, the industry-spe cific human capital stock exhibits mean reversion, and this gen erates a stationary firm size distribution. If shocks to the human capital accumulation technology are lognormal, then the size distribution is lognormal. As shown in Figure I , the lognormal distribution has many fewer large firms than are observed in the data.
LB. Outline of the Paper
The model of technology adoption is set up in Section II. The size distribution is characterized in Section III and the balanced growth path is determined in Section IV. Imitation is introduced in Section V, and the relations between entry costs, the size distribution, and the growth rate of the economy are described. Section VI presents calibrations, allowing for multiple industries with different cost structures and growth rates. Concluding re marks are in Section VII.
II. Technology Adoption

II.A. Consumers
Time is continuous and indexed by t. There is a continuum of consumers alive at any point in time. The population size at time t is He^, and the population growth rate i\ is nonnegative.
During their lifetimes, consumers supply one unit of labor at every point in time. There is a representative consumer with preferences over rates of dynastic consumption {Ct}t>0 of a com posite good, defined by the utility function, / r r?? -I v I/a?y) (e pe-nCte-*]1-" dt The discount rate p and the intertemporal elasticity of substitu tion I/7 are positive. The composite good is made up of a contin uum of differentiated commodities. Preferences over these com modities are additively separable with weights that define the type of a commodity. This implies that all commodities of the same type and trading at the same price are consumed at the same rate. Let ct(u,p) be consumption at time t of a commodity of type u that trades at a price p. In equilibrium, there will be a measure Mt of commodities that are available at time t, defined on the set of commodity types and prices. The composite good is a version of the one specified in Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] . For some P G (0,1), f l1/p (1) Ct= u^cfiuj)) dMt(u,p) .
The type u of a commodity can be viewed as measure of its quality. The level of ct(u,p) is chosen to minimize the cost of acquiring Ct. This implies that The price elasticity of the demand for commodity (u,p) is -0), and the implied expenditure share is u(p/Pt)~^/a~^\
The representative consumer faces a standard presentbudget constraint. The consumer's wealth consists of claim firms and labor income. Along the balanced growth path structed below, per capita consumption and real wages gro common rate k. The paths of per capita consumption and wages are denoted by C^e-^ = CeKt and wt = weKt. Whe composite good is used as the numeraire, the interest r constant and given by r = p + 7K. The following assum ensures that the present value of aggregate consumptio labor income is finite.
Assumption 1. The growth rates r| and k satisfy i\ > 0 an 7K > K + T|.
This assumption implies that p > (1 ? 7)k, and thus util finite.
II.B. Firms
A firm is defined by its unique access to a technology for producing a particular differentiated commodity. At age a, a firm that was set up at time t uses Lta units of labor to produce ztaLta units of a differentiated commodity of quality uta. Given a price ptta, the revenues of the firm are given by Rta = pttazttaLt9JPt9 in units of the composite good. The demand function for type-z^ a commodities implies that these revenues can be written as (4) Rt,a = c};Z (zt,aLt,ar, where Zta ? (uj'^zf^)1^ combines the state of preferences and technology. Firm revenues vary with aggregate consumption, the weight uta of its output in the utility function, and its productiv ity level zta. With some abuse of terminology, the combination of quality and quantity measured by Zt>a will be referred to simply as productivity. The productivities Zt a are assumed to evolve independently across firms, according to
where {Wt?a}a>0 is a standard Brownian motion and Z is an initial condition.8 Note that Zt0 = ZeQst is the initial productivity of a new firm at time t. Thus 8^ is the rate at which the produc tivity of entering firms grows over time. The trend of log produc tivity for incumbent firms is determined by 0/. The difference between QE and 07 is a key determinant of the firm size distribu tion. In Section V, 6? will be made endogenous.
An existing firm can be continued only at a cost equal to kF units of labor per unit of time. The firm must exit if this fixed cost is not paid, and exit is irreversible. One interpretation is that it is costly to preserve the information accumulated as a result of past firm-specific shocks to preferences and technology, and that this information is lost as soon as the required costs are not incurred.9
Measured in units of the composite good, the value Vt[Z] at time t of a firm with initial productivity ZedEt is given by VIZ] = maxEt <Tm(i?,,a -wt+a[Lt^a + \F\) da .
L ?
The maximization is subject to (4) and (5) and subject to the restriction that production and exit decisions only depend on the available information.
The aggregate supply of labor grows at a rate tj, and every firm must use at least XF units of labor to stay in business. Along the balanced growth path, the number of firms grows at the rate i). Entry and exit generates time-? cross-sectional distributions of labor inputs Lt_aa and productivities relative to trend Zt_aae~*Et that are time invariant. Since the number of firms grows at a rate t\, the growth rate k of per capita consumption must also be the growth rate of average revenues per firm. To gether with (4) this gives (6) K = e*+(n^H Population growth implies growth in the number of differentiated commodities. This adds to the growth rate dE of productivity, with 8. This productivity process will result, for example, if both uta and zta are geometric Brownian motions. 9. Atkeson and Kehoe [2005] assume perfect competition together with de creasing returns to variable inputs and interpret \F as the cost of a managerial fixed factor, along the lines of Lucas [1978] . Much of what follows continues to hold for such an alternative model. a slope that is large when substitution between these commodi ties is difficult. Production Decisions. Firms choose variable labor to maxi mize variable profits Rta -u)t+aLta, subject to (4). The optimal choice is
Together with (5) and (6) Firm size has a negative drift when productivity inside the firm is expected to grow more slowly than the productivity of new en trants. Note that the differences in these growth rates and the variance of productivity shocks are greatly magnified when the differentiated goods are close substitutes.
The function S [Z] defined in (9) plays an important role in the rest of the paper. Along the balanced growth path, where (6) holds, it relates the de-trended productivity of any firm to its size. More precisely, eS[Z] is the size of any firm with productivity ZeQEt at time t, relative to its fixed costs at time t. In particular, it is the size relative to fixed costs of a new firm entering with a de trended initial productivity Z.
The Exit Decision. The presence of fixed costs implies a min imum size. Firms with very low productivity choose to exit since they face only a small probability of ever recovering the fixed costs required to continue the firm. The value of a firm of size s relative to its current fixed costs is V(s) = maxEl e-(r-K)a(eSa -1) da\sQ = s \. Assumption 1 implies that r > k, and, thus, the fixed cost of operating a firm forever is finite. Assumption 2 means that r > k + jjl + a2/2, and this implies that the revenues of such a policy are also finite. Together, these assumptions are sufficient to en sure that the value of a firm is finite. The value function V(s) must satisfy the following Bellman equation in the range of s where a firm is not shut down:
where ^V(s) = |xDV(s) + a2D2V(s)/2 is the drift of V(s). The return to owning a firm consists of a capital gain k + ^W(s)IV(s) and a dividend yield (es -1)/V(s). It is optimal to shut down a firm when its size s falls below some threshold b. Given that the firm is shut down at b, it must be that the value of a firm is zero at that point. This implies the boundary condition V(b) = 0. The optimal threshold must be such that V is differentiable at 6, and so DV(b) = 0. A further boundary condition follows from the fact that the value function cannot exceed the value of a firm that operates without fixed costs. This implies that V(s) must lie below es/(r -[k + jjl + a2/2]).
With these boundary conditions, the Bellman equation has only one solution10:
for s > 6 and V(s) = 0 otherwise. The exit barrier b is determined by (12) Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that ? > 0, and that 6 is well defined. As expected, V(s) is strictly increasing on (6,o?). It will be useful to note that, for any fixed x, V(x + 6) is increasing in ? and V(x + 6) goes to zero as ? goes to zero. The latter will happen when p, becomes large and negative. If the productivity of new entrants grows very quickly, then the value of being an incumbent at any given distance x away from the exit barrier will be very small.
Entry. New firms can be set up at a cost that is linear in the entry rate. Entry at a rate of I firms per unit of time costs XEl units of labor per unit of time. Entry results in a draw of Z from a distribution J. At time t, a draw Z yields an initial productivity Ze%Et and thus an initial size S[Z]. Along the balanced growth path, entry takes place at all times. This means that the profits from entry must be zero:
The distribution J is taken to be exogenous until imitat introduced in Section V. The only assumption needed her the implied value of entry is finite.
Assumption 3. The initial productivity distribution J sa J Zp/(1~p) dJ(Z) < oo.
The value of entry depends on steady-state wages and ag consumption via S [Z]. Recall from (9) that S [Z] is propor (C/w)/w?/(1~P\ The returns to entry can therefore be m trarily small or large by taking (C/w)/w^/(1~^ to be small or large, respectively. Thus, the zero-profit condition (13) implies a unique equilibrium value for (C/w)/w^/(1~^\ and therefore also for S [Z] . It is not difficult to see that S[Z] is increasing in \E. In equilibrium, the initial size and productivity of firms must be high when entry is costly.
III. The Distribution of Firm Characteristics
There is a continuum of infinitesimal firms. The underlying stochastic structure is assumed to be such that probability dis tributions for individual firm size can be interpreted as cross sectional size distributions for the whole continuum of firms.
Along the balanced growth path to be constructed, there is a time-invariant cross-sectional distribution of firm size. Firms en ter and exit at constant aggregate rates in such a way that the aggregate measure of firms expands at the rate t]. A time-invari ant size distribution will result if r\ is positive, or if t\ is zero and |x is negative. In any equilibrium, the distribution of firm size, measured by es, must also have a finite mean. The following assumption will turn out to be necessary and sufficient for this to be the case, given that ti is nonnegative.
Assumption 4. The productivity parameters satisfy i) > pi + V2 a2.
Note that jul + a2/2 is the drift of the size variable eSa. Thus, Assumption 4 means that the size of a typical incumbent firm is Kolmogorov forward equation.11 The resulting partial differential equation for m is given by (14) Dam(a,s) = -r\m(a,s) -pDsra(a,s) + V2 a2Dssm(a,s) for all a > 0 and s > b. The first term on the right-hand side of (14) reflects the fact that the measure of firms grows over time.
The remaining two terms describe how m(a,s) evolves as a result of stochastic changes in the sizes of individual firms.
Firms use at least XF units of labor, and so the measure of firms has to be finite in any equilibrium. As age goes to zero, the size distribution implied by m must approach the size distribu tion among entrants. This distribution, denoted by G, follows from the productivity distribution J among firms attempting entry via J(Z) = G(S[Z]). This implies the boundary condition 11. See Feller [1971] and Dixit and Pindyck [1994] for applications to indus try equilibrium. This solution can be found in Harrison [1985, p. 46] for the case of no population growth and G equal to a point mass. The two terms that define e~^aty(a,s\x) both satisfy (14). For small values of a, the first term approximates a normal probability density that puts almost all probability close to s = x. The second term converges to zero as a goes to zero, since s + x > 26. This implies the boundary condition (15). The fact that \\t(a,b\x) = 0 for a > 0 implies (16). Together with ti > 0, Assumption 4 suffices to ensure that e~y]a\\f(a,s\x) can be integrated over all a > 0 and s > b so that the overall measure of firms is finite. The following remark will be used to further characterize m.
Remark. The roots of the characteristic polynomial -i) + y^z + z2d2/2 of (14) are a and ? a*, where
Since t] > 0, both roots are real, and Assumption 4 is equiv alent to a > 1. If t] = 0, then a simplifies to a = ? |x/(a2/2). The root a* is nonnegative and positive if and only if tj > 0. If |x < 0, then a*/i) converges to l/(?jjl) as T| goes to zero.
Observe that m(a,s) reduces to e~y]a\\f(a,s\x) if G is replaced by a distribution concentrated at x. This means that e"T]a^(a,s\x) is the density of firm age and size among all firms with the same initial size x. Let ir(a9s\x) denote the associated probability den sity. Integrating e~y]a\\s(a,s\x) to obtain the normalizing constant yields /l_c-?,(*-A)\-l Tr(a,s\x) = I-1 e ^(a^lx).
Combining this with the solution for m{a,s) gives foe (l-e-^X-b)\ (18) m(a,s) = Tr(a,s\x)\-1 dG{x).
Jb
Thus, m(a,s) is a weighted sum of the densities 7r(a,s\x) dG(x), with weights that are increasing in the distance of the initial size x from the exit barrier 6. In the special case of t) = 0, these weights reduce to (x -b)/(-\x), which is the expected life span of a new firm entering with size x. Relatively large entering firms stay around longer and appear more often in the population than suggested by the size distribution of entrants.
III.A. The Age Distribution
If heterogeneity among entrants is small relative to hetero geneity in the overall population, then the age distribution will look much like the one obtained by conditioning on a typical x > b. Integrating ir(a,s\x) over s gives the age density among firms with the same size at entry. The result is that tt(s|x) is the firm size density. This density closely matches the data presented in Figure I if x ? b is small and a ? 1.06. More generally, suppose that G is a distribution with few firms that are much larger than the exit barrier. Then the size marginal m(s) will inherit the exponentially declining tail common to all tt(s\x) over most of the support (6,00). The deviations from linearity seen in Figure I occur for small firms: there are fewer of them than would be the case if the size distribution was Pareto. Since ir(s|je) is upward sloping on the interval (b,x), this is exactly what is predicted when G tends to have most of its mass close to the exit barrier.
To emphasize the importance of randomness in shaping the firm size distribution, it is instructive to consider what happens as the variance of productivity shocks goes to zero. For simplicity, suppose that t\ = 0. Assumption 4 then requires p, < 0, and at a2 = 0, one obtains ? = (r -k)/||x| and 6 = 0. Firms exit immediately when they no longer break even. There is no option value that would justify continuing to operate a loss-making firm. An entering firm starts with size x, and this size will then decline linearly to 0, at which point the firm exits. One can verify that the size distribution converges to a uniform distribution on (0, x) as a2 goes to 0. For very small a2, most firms are less profitable and smaller than the most recent entrant. This is in sharp contrast to what is found in the data [Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 1988, 1989; Caves 1998 ]. The randomness in productivity growth gen erates a selection mechanism by which the typical firm can be much larger and productive than recent entrants.
IV. The Balanced Growth Path
Per capita consumption and wages grow at the rate k given by (6). The resulting interest rate is r = p + 7K, and together with k this pins down the value function V(s). The zero-profit condition then determines (C/w)/w^/a~?) and thereby the func tion S[Z] that relates size to productivity. The resulting size distribution of firms was described in the preceding section.
It remains to determine the levels of per capita consumption and wages as well as the rate / at which firms attempt to enter. These variables are implied by market clearing conditions in the goods and labor markets. Let LEe^\ Lpe^\ and Le^ denote the amounts of labor assigned to, respectively, setting up new firms, fixed costs to operate existing firms, and production. It follows from the firm decision rules (7) At t = 0, the distribution of productivities available to potential entrants is J(Z). At that same time, there will be some measure of incumbent firms with given levels of productivity. The balanced growth path of Proposition 1 will be an equilibrium if at t = 0 the density of productivity among incumbent firms is m(S[Z])|DS[Z]|. What happens for different initial conditions is not known.
To see the second part of Proposition 1, observe that a pro portional reduction in (XE,XF) does not affect the zero-profit con dition. The function S[Z] and the size density m(s) therefore do not change. It follows from (21) and the labor market clearing condition that / increases in such a way that (XE,XF)I remains constant. Together with (22) and C = Y this implies that C/w remains unchanged. Since S[Z] is proportional to (l/XF)(C/w)/ wp/(1-p), it follows that IIw must increase with an elasticity (1p)/p. This is also the effect on consumption. Lower setup and fixed costs imply a larger number of firms. Since firms are identified with distinct differentiated goods, this means a larger number of goods. The elasticity (1 -p)/(3 measures the increase in composite consumption arising from this increase in variety.
Note that (21) and (22) depend on (XE,XF)/H when labor and output are expressed in per capita terms. Also, the function S [Z] can be written in terms ofC/H and XFIH. Thus, an increase in the size of the population is equivalent to a proportional reduction in the setup and fixed costs. The resulting elasticity (1 ? p)/p of per capita consumption with respect to H corresponds to the one obtained for the growth rate k in (6). The benefits of lower setup and fixed costs and larger population sizes derived here replicate those obtained for a static economy by Krugman [1979] .
V. Imperfect Imitation?Endogenizing the Tail Index
The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 relies on the assumption that the tail index a of the conditional size distribu tion ir(s\x) is greater than one. The data in Figure I suggest that a should be close to one. The parameter a is a function of the population growth rate t|, the curvature parameter (3 of the utility function, and the technology parameters [0^,0z,az]. So far, these parameters have been taken as exogenous, and the model can explain Figure I only if these parameters happen to be of just the right magnitude to imply a *** 1.06. This section makes the trend parameter dE of the distribution of entry productivity endogenous and gives conditions under which the resulting equilibrium tail index will be only slightly above one.
By paying fixed costs, incumbent firms can continue to pro duce and generate stochastic productivity improvements. The productivity of surviving firms will tend to grow forever as long as the within-firm growth rate of productivity 67 is not too small. If new firms had to start from the same level of productivity as existing firms entered with in the past, then the value of entry would eventually become too small to justify the cost of entry. The high productivity of successful survivors would drive up wages beyond the level at which it would be profitable for new firms to enter. The size distribution of firms would be nonstationary.
To avoid this outcome, some mechanism is needed that al lows potential entrants to benefit from the productivity improve ments obtained by incumbents. The mechanism proposed here is imitation. Suppose potential entrants can pay the entry cost XE to select a random incumbent firm and then adopt a scaled-down version of its technology. More precisely, if the randomly selected firm at time t has a productivity XeQEt, then the potential entrant obtains a technology capable of producing a new good with pro ductivity Ze*Et = XeQst~ul~^w. The parameter 8 measures how much the productivity of the potential entrant will be below that of the incumbent. It is taken to be nonnegative so that imitation is imperfect. Imitation is difficult if 8 is large. The implied initial size of the potential entrant is S[Z] = S[X] ? 8, and the entry attempt is successful if this exceeds b.
In this mechanism, random sampling and imitation tie the expected size and profitability of a potential entrant to the aver age size and profitability of incumbents. This sets up strong incentives for entry when the average incumbent becomes large and profitable. The result is a stationary size distribution with a well defined and finite average firm size.14
V.A. The Stationary Size Distribution
Suppose the cross-sectional distribution of productivity is stationary when productivity is de-trended by some growth rate 6#, to be determined in Section V.B. Suppose further that the resulting size distribution has a probability density f(s). The where eA = 1/'f% m(x) dx is the rate at which new firms attempt to enter, as a fraction of the number of existing firms. Note that eA must exceed t] if the number of firms is to grow at a rate j).
Lemma 2. Suppose |x < 8t], and let eA > ti be the unique entry rate for which the characteristic equation t] = y,z + a2z2/2 + ?Ae~bx has only one solution. This solution is given by z = ?, where 14. In Eaton and Eckstein [1997] , knowledge spillovers across existing cities provide the mechanism by which the size distribution of cities is prevented from spreading out. Jovanovic and MacDonald [1994] and Eeckhout and Jovanovic [2002] allow all firms to copy, imperfectly, from the whole population of firms. Here, the spillover is only from incumbents to potential entrants. Incumbents are locked into their idiosyncratic productivity processes and are not assumed to be able to imitate the successes of other incumbent firms.
(24) ^-{^ + l)+i^f+?+im
Then the stationary density that solves (23) For 8 = 0, (24) is understood to represent the limiting value ? = ? p/cr2. One can derive (24) by minimizing the right-hand side of the characteristic equation. The condition p, < 8t| is necessary and sufficient to ensure that ? > 0. The tail probabilities of f(s) behave like e ~is for large s, and so ? does indeed represent the tail index of the size distribution. For large 8 entrants tend to be small and the tail index ? is essentially the same as the tail index a of the conditional size distribution tt(s\x). The right-hand side of (24) is decreasing in p, and thus increasing in the growth rate 0^.
The higher the average growth rate QE of productivity in the population relative to the drift 67 of surviving incumbents, the more aggregate productivity growth must be due to selection, and this implies a size distribution with a thinner tail. The mean of es implied by f(s) is finite if and only if ? > 1.
Lemma 2 defines a particular entry rate eA and solves (23). For any other eA > r\, the differential equation (23) (24) and (25), consider a new "industry" of many firms that all start out with the same initial size x > b. Suppose that over time new firms attempt to enter this industry at some rate eA by imitating incumbents in the industry, as described above. Let n(a,s) be the size density of firms in this industry at age a. Then n(a,s) satisfies Ban(a,s) = ? p,Ds7i(a,s) + d2Dssn(a,s)/2 + eAn(a,s + 8) and n(a,b) = 0.
Consider the special case 8 = 0 and take the initial measure of firms to be one. The solution for n(a,s) is then given by n(a,s) = eeACt\\f(a,s\x). Normalizing this solution by the number of firms yields a distribution that converges to the gamma distribution (24) and (25) as the industry ages. This is also true when entry rates vary over time and when firms at the initial date differ in size, as long as the initial size distribution has a support that is compact and contained in (6, oo). Thus, compactly supported initial size distributions converge to (24) and (25) and not to the other solutions of (23). Given the limiting distribution (24) and (25) generated by the process of selection and imitation, the entry rate ?A defined in Lemma 2 is simply the rate required to make the number of firms grow at a rate ti.15
V.B. The Balanced Growth Path and Zipfs Law
The size density/"(s) constructed in Lemma 2 is a function of the assumed productivity growth rate QE through its dependence on the drift parameter jul. The value function V(s) is also a func tion of QE, via |x, as well as via the equilibrium interest rate r and the growth rate k of per capita consumption and wages. Taken together, this means that the expected profits from entry are a function of QE. The only values of 0# that are consistent with balanced growth are those for which these profits are zero:
Together with (24) and (25), this zero-profit condition determines QE and f(s). Taking DGix) = fix + 8) in Lemma 1 gives the density mis) of firms per entry attempt, and inserting fis) into the differential equation (23) yields the equilibrium attempted entry rate eA. To complete the construction of a balanced growth path, recall that the relation between firm size s and productivity ZedEt is determined by s = S[Z\. From the definition (9), eS[z] is proportional to iC/w)/w^/a~^\ The location of the productivity density fiS[Z])\DSiZ)\ is therefore determined by the log of iC/w)/w^/(1~^\ On a balanced growth path, the density fiS[Z])\DSiZ)\ must correspond to the density of productivity among incumbent firms at the initial date, which is an initial condition for the economy. Assuming that the productivity distri bution at the initial date is consistent with balanced growth, this 15. With perfect imitation, the density n(a,s) has a spectral representation [Karlin and Taylor 1981, p. 393] consisting of eigenfunctions of the right-hand side of (23). The underlying reason for the convergence to (24) and (25) is that this density is the eigenfunction associated with the supremum of the eigenvalues that appear in this representation. The technical appendix available at www.luttmer. org proves the convergence to (24) and (25) and this interpretation. The stability argument described here covers only the case 8 = 0 and does not explain why |x and b are constant parameters. A more complete analysis of stability awaits further research. requirement determines the equilibrium value of iC/w)/w^/a~^\ As in the case of exogenous growth, (21) and (22) together with goods and labor market clearing conditions determine the ratio C/w and the rate / at which firms attempt to enter. Together with iC/w)/w^/(1~^ this yields C and w separately, and the economy will be on a balanced growth path if the number of firms at the initial date equals / /? mis) ds = //eA.
The following proposition shows that this construction works if consumers discount the future at a high enough rate. Precise conditions and a proof are in Appendix I.
Proposition 2. Suppose the population growth rate y\ and the drift 07 of within-firm technological progress are nonnegative. If the discount rate p is large enough, then there exists a balanced growth path with a size distribution defined by (24) and (25). The tail index ? of the size distribution converges to one?Zipf s Law?as the ratio XE/XF of entry over fixed costs grows without bound.
The existence of a balanced growth path and the circumstances in which Zipf s law arises are most transparent in the special case of logarithmic utility. This case implies that r = p + k, simplifying the dependence of the value of a firm on dE. For fixed u = x ? b, the value Viu + b) is then unambiguously decreasing in 0#.
Higher productivity growth in the population drives incumbents at a given distance from the exit barrier out of business more quickly, and this implies a low firm value. As noted earlier, a higher dE generates a size distribution with a thinner tail, or a higher ?. High-? gamma densities (25) are stochastically domi nated by low-? gamma densities in a first-order sense. Since Viu + b) is an increasing function of u, it follows that the right-hand side of the zero-profit condition (26) is decreasing in QE.16 Equivalently, the expected value of entry is decreasing in the tail index ?. It is not difficult to show that the value of entry goes to zero for very large ?. Finally, the dominant term in the value function Vix) is the firm size variable ex, and this implies that the expected value of entry grows without bound as the tail index ? approaches 1 from above. The right-hand side of the zero-profit condition is therefore as shown in Figure III If the utility function exhibits more c mic utility, then the value function cont for high enough discount rates. But if factor l/(r -k) is increasing in k and t can outweigh the negative effect on the gap QE -07 between productivity grow the drift of incumbent productivity. The some range, increase with the growth rat population. This can make the expected tone in 9# and ?. The proof given in balanced growth path does nevertheles discount rates p. The equilibrium conditions (23) and (26) and, therefore, the growth rate 6^ are independent of the scale of the entry and fixed costs (XE,XF). As in the case of exogenous growth, lowering both costs at the same time increases the level of output with an elasticity (1 -p)/0. The effects of changing only barriers to entry?the entry cost XE or the difficulty of imitation 8?are described in the following corollary of Proposition 2.
Corollary. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 2 hold. The growth rate 8# of productivity in the population is decreasing in the entry cost parameter XE and the imitation parameter 8 when 7 > 1 and for sufficiently large entry costs when 7 < 1.
For 7^1, this result follows from the fact that the value of entry, as illustrated in Figure III , is decreasing in the tail index ?. A higher entry cost X^ implies a higher equilibrium value of entry and, thus, a lower equilibrium value of ? and a lower QE. Simi larly, a larger 8 implies a lower equilibrium value of ? since the expected value of entry is lower when imitation is more difficult.
Given that the right-hand side of (24) is increasing in 8 and decreasing in p,, this implies a lower growth rate 6#. For 7 < 1, these conclusions continue to hold provided entry costs are high. High entry costs imply that ? must be close to 1 and the expected value of entry can be shown to be monotone for all ? close enough to the asymptote ? = 1.
If imitation is difficult and population growth is small, then (24) implies that ? ~ -p/(a2/2). Together with the definitions (10) of p, and a2, this yields a simple expression relating the equilib rium productivity growth rate 6# and the equilibrium tail index ?:
The drift of incumbent productivity is 67, and the second term in (27) captures the effect of selection on productivity growth in the population of firms. Lower barriers to entry imply smaller firms, and this corresponds to higher values of ?. By (27), this means faster productivity growth in the population. Incumbent produc tivity drifts up at a rate 67 in any case, but the lower barriers to entry generate more firm turnover, and this increases the effect of selection.
V.D. Firm Exit Rates by Age
The specific size distribution for entering firms implied by imitation generates a precise prediction about the dependence of firm exit rates on age. The main properties of the hazard rate are summarized in the following proposition. Explicit formulas and a sketch of the proof are given in Appendix II.
Proposition 3. If 8 = 0, then firms exit from a given age cohort with a hazard rate that is independent of age. If 8 > 0, then the hazard rate hia) is strictly decreasing and satisfies lim hia) = oo? lim hia) = ~ -For given x > b, the hazard rate of the conditional survivor function A(a|x) defined in (19) is a hump-shaped function of age and zero at age zero. Firms entering with a productivity that exceeds the exit barrier by a certain amount do not exit initially. As these firms are subjected to productivity shocks, some start to exit, and the hazard rate increases. Eventually, sufficiently many surviving firms will have moved away from the exit barrier as a result of favorable productivity shocks, and the hazard rate de clines again. In contrast, firms in a cohort of imitating entrants come with initial sizes x that are arbitrarily close to the exit barrier b, and so significant exit will take place right from the start. If new entrants can perfectly copy a randomly selected incumbent, then the rate at which firms exit is not hump-shaped but constant. If imitation is imperfect, then entrants tend to be smaller than incumbents. The probability of exit decreases with size, and it takes time for firms to grow. The result is an exit rate that declines with age.18
VI. Calibrations
Growth is due to increased variety, within-firm technological progress, and selection. This section describes how the observed size distribution together with entry or exit data can be used to 18. Caves [1998] discusses the literature on firm exit rates and cites studies documenting hazard rates that decline with age. Based on monthly observations of a cohort of new firms in the Munich (Germany) area, Bruderl, Preisendbrfer, and Ziegler [1992] report a hump-shaped hazard function. Nucci [1998] finds a hump-shaped hazard function for establishments that peaks around an age of one year. SELECTION, GROWTH, AND THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FIRMS 1131 infer the magnitude of these different sources of growth under the assumption that preferences are described by (3 = 0.9. This benchmark value implies that the differentiated goods produced by different firms are close substitutes and that variable profits are relatively small. Data on revenues and variable costs could be used to determine p. Alternatively, p could be identified from the demand curves (2) using price and quantity observations on the composite goods sold by individual firms, and instruments corre lated with technology shocks but not taste shocks. A careful investigation along these lines is beyond the scope of this paper.
VI.A. Inferring the Contribution of Selection to Growth
The regression line through all the data points in Figure I that represent five or more employees has a slope of -1.06, suggesting that ? ? 1.06. A comparison of the size distributions of incumbents and entrants can be used to infer the imitation pa rameter 8. The statistics reported in Figure I To decompose the economy-wide rate of technological progress 9# into a within-firm growth rate 87 and a selection component 6^ -67 requires an estimate of p,. When r\ is small and 8 is large, the definition (24) of ? implies ? p, *** ?a2/2. The variance a2 of firm growth can be identified from the rate es at which new firms succeed to enter per unit of time, relative to the total number of firms. This entry rate equals the population growth rate plus the exit rate. The rate at which firms cross the exit barrier b is given by Df(b)a2/2,21 and, therefore, es = t] + 19. See Table 743 Since goods are assumed to be close sub growth is only about 1 percent per ann growth of increases in variety is small. the tail index ? is only marginally above 1 is as large as 11.6 percent per annum impl be large, by (28). Selection must then pla when the differentiated commodities prod are close substitutes.
VLB. Some Empirical Caveats
Although the gamma distribution ha match the data, it does not quite fit the e shown in Figure I . If employment stat variable labor, then the tail index ? fraction of firms with no more than t minimum firm size of 0.65 employees. T sity has too few small firms, and the impl at least a thousand employees is more t the data. Alternatively, the maximum l on the data shown in Figure I manufacturing firms obtained from, respectively, Dunne, Rob erts, and Samuelson [1988] and Audretsch [1991] ; a cohort of Portuguese manufacturing firms set up in 1983 and studied by Mata and Portugal [1994] ; and a cohort of new U. S. employer firms set up in the early 1990s described in Headd [2003] . Also shown for comparison are the survivor functions that correspond to 8 = 0 and 8 = oo? holding fixed p, = -0.12 and a = 0.43.
Although there is variation in empirical survival rates that is not accounted for, the observed survival rates are in the range pre dicted by the model. The estimated standard deviation of firm growth, a = 0.43, is surprisingly large. For small fixed costs, this standard deviation is also, approximately, the standard deviation of the stock return of a typical firm. Campbell et al. [2001] find that the annual standard deviation of the stock return is about 0.3 for the typical NYSE or NASDAQ listed firm, and most of the standard devia tion is due to idiosyncratic shocks. At the cost of underpredicting the number of large firms, the maximum likelihood estimate of ? provides a partial remedy. Given ? = 1.30, the empirical fractions of incumbent and entering firms with fewer than twenty employ ees imply 8 = 2.5, and the resulting standard deviation of firm growth shrinks to a = 0.35. This is noticeably closer to the stock market proxy of 0.3. But leverage considerations suggest that even this proxy is only an upper bound on the standard deviation of firm growth rates. An alternative remedy is to allow for random exit by firms that are not at the exit barrier b as in Luttmer [2004] . Observed entry rates are then consistent with lower exit rates at the exit barrier, and this implies a lower variance of firm growth rates. Random exit would also imply a smaller role for selection.22
VI. C. Heterogeneity Across Industries
In the economy described so far, all firms face the same demand curves, and all experience changes in demand and pro ductivity described by the same drift and diffusion parameters. No doubt, the degree to which the differentiated commodities produced in an industry are substitutable differs across indus tries as do the typical rates of technological progress. Nor are entry and fixed costs or the difficulty of imitation likely to be the same across industries. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the gamma density implied by a one-industry economy does not quite match the data in Figure I . This section shows that even a limited amount of heterogeneity across industries can be used to produce the remarkable fit shown in Figure I .23 Consider an economy with N different goods, each of which is a composite of a continuum of differentiated commodities. Indus tries are identified with different composite goods. As before, 22. Evidence presented in Cabral and Mata [2003] suggests that up to 1991 exit from the 1984 cohort of new Portuguese manufacturing firms was unrelated to size. Substantial heterogeneity in fixed costs could give rise to this. 23. Luttmer [2004] allows for additional sources of within-industry hetero geneity by incorporating within-industry variation in fixed and entry costs as well as in technologies used to combine physical capital and labor to produce differen tiated goods. Wages also grow at this rate. The price index for aggregate consumption is Pt = U^=1 iPnJvnYn, where Pnt is the price index for the composite good of industry n, defined as in (3). The relative prices PntIPt must be given by iPn/P)eiK~Kn)t, since ex penditure shares are constant. Let XF n be the fixed cost required to continue a firm in industry n. A calculation along the lines of (7)-(9) implies that the relation between productivity and size in industry n is given by eSn[Z] = VniX -Pn) /PnZPJPy^-^ C XF,n \ w ) w'
where P = U? = 1 iPJvn)Vn. The gross revenues at time in industry n with a productivity ZedE-nt are equal to units of labor. The (logarithmic) size of such a firm f Brownian motion with drift juin and diffusion coeffic fined as in (10), using the industry-specific paramete ^E,n->^i,n^z,n\-Firms choose to follow the same stoppi before, exiting when size falls below an industry-specif bn defined as in (12). The size distributions in all indu therefore of the form derived in Section III.
Suppose firms can choose which industry to enter, a at a cost of XE n units of labor, attempt to imitate incum that industry along the lines of Section V. The extent entrants lag behind incumbents in industry n is measur Potential entrants can direct their entry attempts to industry, but imitation of firms in the chosen industry i fect, as before.
This setup leads to equilibrium conditions for the growth rate dEn and size density fn that are exactly an (23)-(26). The value functions Vn appearing in equilibrium con ditions analogous to (26) depend on \x,n and the difference r ? k between the interest rate and the aggregate growth rate k. Since k depends on an expenditure-weighted average of the industry growth rates 0# ?, this gives a system of N equilibrium conditions in N unknown growth rates 6# n. For general 7, the analysis of this system is more complicated than the analysis that led to Proposition 2. But logarithmic utility implies r ? k = p, and then the equations uncouple: the zero-profit condition for industry n only depends on the growth rate QEn of industry productivity and the size density/^. As a result, the proof of Proposition 2 applies. In particular, industries with high ratios XEn/XF n or large 8? will have tail indices ?n close to 1, and, ceteris paribus, growth rates ?E,n that are not far above 07 n.
The overall size density will be a weighted average of the industry size densities fn. The log of variable labor I used by a firm of size s in industry n is determined by el = esXF n$n/(l ? 0n). The economy-wide density of log variable labor is therefore for weights qn that add up to one. These weights are proportional to the numbers of firms in each industry. The number of firms in industry n times the average revenues in that industry should equal the value of aggregate consumption of the composite good produced in the industry, or vn times the value of aggregate consumption. It follows that the number of firms in industry n is proportional to Qn a vj 1 *'" esfn(s) ds .
In other words, the number of firms in an industry is proportional to the expenditure share of that industry and inversely propor tional to average gross revenues in the industry.
The curve shown in Figure I Heterogeneous Industries bents they try to imitate, and their size is less tha the size of these incumbents. All industries have p technology shocks parameterized by the same [07 entry and fixed costs given by the same XE n and XF growth is r\ = 0.01, utility is logarithmic, p = 0.0 as before. The values of the common XE n/(XF n/p chosen to ensure a tail index of 1.04 and an econom rate of 11.6 percent per annum. This yields XE J(X and uZn = 0.041. The implied standard deviation of is 0.37, down somewhat from its puzzlingly high v the one-industry economy. Figure V shows the implied industry-specific ta entry rate zSn, and productivity growth rates 6^ ny fraction of firms qn in industry n. As expected, which it is easier to imitate have more entry, mor tivity growth through selection, and a size distri thinner tail. The tail index of the overall distribu mined by ?iV = 1.04, even though the fraction of firm N is less than 1 percent. The entry rate is highest Selection contributes 1.82 percent to an output growth rate of 2.72 percent in this industry, while the corresponding numbers are only 0.82 and 1.73 percent in industry N. The average con tribution of selection to growth across industries is 1.09 percent, essentially the same as in the one-industry economy as is the aggregate survivor function shown in Figure IV . The only heterogeneity across industries assumed in Figures I and V is in the imitation parameter 8?. Because of this, larger firms tend to be in industries with low productivity growth. If, instead, industries only differ in terms of the standard deviation dz n of productivity shocks, then large firms would tend to be in the high-az n industries where selection produces high produc tivity growth. Other possible sources of variation are the drift of incumbent productivity growth, within-industry substitutability of the differentiated commodities, and fixed and entry costs. Rossi-Hansberg and Wright [2004] document how size distribu tions vary across industries. Further research is needed to see if and how this variation can be accounted for using the model economy described here, augmented with the additional sources of within-industry heterogeneity described in Luttmer [2004] .
VII. Concluding Remarks
If new entrants can imitate incumbents, then growth is rapid when barriers to entry are low. The engine of growth is experi mentation by firms combined with selection. Lucky firms receive another draw, and unlucky ones exit and are replaced by more productive firms. Firms are experiments that can be cut short and replaced by new ones when they do not perform well. Reducing the cost of entry speeds up the rate of economy-wide experimen tation and raises the growth rate of the economy. The resulting size distribution is stationary because potential entrants can learn from successes achieved by incumbents. It has a very thick tail when entry is difficult, nevertheless.
This model is consistent with three first-order features of the data. The economy grows at a steady rate. Firm exit rates are high for young firms and low for firms that have survived for some time. The predicted size distribution of firms closely approxi mates Zipf s law if entry is difficult. This tends to be true even if entry is easy in some industries. The closed-form solutions derived in this paper rely heavily on the absence of aggregate uncertainty and on the use of steady endowment is finite and ? > 1. Under these conditions, the zero profit condition (26) If ? > 0, r > k, and ? > 1, then the right-hand side of (30) is increasing in ? and decreasing in r -k and ?.
The definition (24) implies that ? is strictly decreasing in pi, with a horizontal asymptote at -1/8 for large |x. Furthermore, ? can be made arbitrarily large by taking jul small enough. The condition ? > 1 corresponds to jul < jul* where 8ti -(1 + 8/2)a2 ** =-IT8-'
The parameter ? defined in (12) depends on |x, both direct via r -k = p + (7 -1) 67 + (?p?J On ~ |x) .
The overall dependence of ? on jx is characterized in the following lemma.
Lemma A2. If r > k, then ? is strictly increasing in jx for all 7 G (0,1], and for all 7 G (l,00) such that (3D P > (l -7) e7 + (^y^)*i + ^ (i -7)2*i.
Existence of an equilibrium will now be shown separately for 7 = 1, 7 > 1, and 7 < 1. Suppose 7 = 1. This implies r ? k = p, and a necessary condition for a balanced growth path to exist is p > r\. This condition is also sufficient. To see this, first recall from (12) and (24) that ? is decreasing and ? is increasing in |x. Furthermore, ?
grows without bound and ? goes to zero as |x goes to -??. It follows that the right-hand side of (30) is an increasing function of jx, with a vertical asymptote at jul* and a horizontal asymptote at 0.
Next suppose 7 > 1. Note that r -k is decreasing in jul. Assume that (31) holds. Then the right-hand side of (30) is in creasing in jul as long as r > k. As jul goes to -00, r -k will become where Aeia) is the survivor function based on initial conditions drawn from feix), and Agia) is the survivor function based on initial conditions drawn from fgix). The resulting hazard rate hia) = -DA(a)/A(a) is a weighted average of the hazard rates heia) = -BAeia)/Aeia) and hgia) = -DA^(a)/A^(a). If 8 > 0, then both heia) and hgia) are decreasing, and this implies that hia) is decreasing. To prove that heia) and hgia) are decreasing, one can use continued-fraction upper and lower bounds for the Mill's ratio $>i?x)l$ix) reported in Lee [1992] . These bounds can also be used to establish the asymptote re ported in Proposition 3. A lengthy proof is available at www.lutt mer.org. At 8 = 0, the hazard rate is constant because (23) implies that the stationary density is an eigenfunction of the operator -\x?)fix) + d2D2fix)/2.
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